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Unconstitutional Conditions Obscured: A
Brief Response to Professor Abrams
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
In his paper in this issue of the San Diego Law Review, Professor
Howard Abrams' takes me to task for my analysis of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions as it appears in the Foreword to the
Harvard Law Review 1987 Supreme Court issue.' Judging from his
response, it is difficult to understand why he bothered with his analy-
sis because he seems to find so little of value in what I have written.
Instead, he uses the opportunity as a platform for the development of
his own inchoate views, which in common fashion stress the impor-
tance of motivational analysis in dealing with unconstitutional condi-
tions. Although he has an obvious familiarity with standard eco-
nomic doctrine, he interprets it so austerely as to render it useless to
attack this, or indeed any other, problem. A more sensible use of
economic theory yields far richer fruit, and is consistent, I believe,
with the positions that I have developed in the Foreword. Professor
Abrams uses his economics to obscure the doctrinal outlines of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. We would all have profited
more if he had used his insights to advance understanding of the
doctrine.
To facilitate my brief reply, I shall follow the organization of Pro-
fessor Abrams' paper which divides his objections to my position into
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago. My thanks to Abigail Abrahams for her research and assistance.
1. Abrams, Economic Analysis and Unconstitutional Conditions: A Reply to Pro-
fessor Epstein, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 359 (1990) [hereinafter Abrams].
2. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Condi-
tions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1988) [hereinafter
Epstein, Foreword]. Strangely, Professor Abrams does not consider the elaboration of my
views in the Symposium published in this Law Review: Epstein, Unconstitutional Condi-
tions and Bargaining Breakdown, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 189 (1989).
three parts. His first point is that I have not explained why the use of
monopoly power by the government constitutes a situation that re-
quires some constitutional supervision. His second point is that my
economic analysis of the doctrine is necessarily flawed because it re-
quires reliance upon the kind of motivational investigations that are
ordinarily regarded as out of bounds by economic theory. His third
point concerns what he considers to be my inadequate treatment of
the externality problem as it normally arises in economic theory.
I. Is MONOPOLY BAD?
Yes. I take great comfort in having to defend my position against
an attack that treats monopoly - indeed legal monopoly run by the
state no less - as an acceptable state of affairs. Professor Abrams
reaches this conclusion by invoking the criterion of Pareto improve-
ment - a change is better only if it makes someone better off and
no one worse off - but he does so in an unfortunate fashion. He
looks only to the situation after the monopolist has gained possession
of the monopoly. Because the monopolist is made worse off by the
introduction of the competitive economy under Professor Abrams'
theory, it is not possible to say that the world is better off with com-
petition than it is with monopoly. It is not possible to make the direct
comparison of the losses to the monopolist with the gains to the con-
sumers as we move to the competitive regime. His argument is capa-
ble, of course, of extension in other areas, for we could also say that
there is no social improvement when one removes the Jim Crow re-
strictions in the Old South or dismantles Apartheid in South Africa,
for in each case those persons who supported the old order lose when
it is displaced.
These striking conclusions rest upon an erroneous view of eco-
nomic analysis. The right question to ask is not whether, with un-
sound institutions in place, any shift will be a Pareto improvement.
The right question to ask is whether from an original position, indi-
viduals who do not know whether they will be a supplier or a con-
sumer would prefer one institutional arrangement over the other.
Within this framework all persons would opt for the greater total
output under the competitive arrangement, because that arrange-
ment would promise greater private returns to each of them. In es-
sence, behind the veil of ignorance each person gets a fixed fractional
share of the whole. Subject to that constraint, each person's own pri-
vate interest is maximized only by maximizing the whole.
The same conclusion may also be reached by another route, the
Kaldor-Hicks formulation, under which one social state is preferable
to another if the individuals in one group could compensate the indi-
viduals in the other group for their losses and still remain better off
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than they were before. By that standard, if consumers could organize
costlessly, they could always buy off the monopolist. However, the
monopolist could never buy off the consumers because the monopo-
list's gain from future monopolization exceeds the losses to consum-
ers. Both of these results are true in all cases because the output
under competition, where sellers price at marginal cost, is greater
than it is under monopoly, where sellers price above marginal cost.
Again, there is an asymmetry in the analysis that allows one state of
the world to be preferred to the other. If Abrams is right, then, in
effect, anti-trust law is misguided because the social gains would
never justify limiting the use of monopoly power.
Using either of these tests of social welfare makes it possible to
reevaluate the hypothetical example' presented by Professor Abrams
under which the captain of the stranger ship arrives and promises to
offer two coconuts to B as long as A destroys one of his own. B is
also prohibited from compensating A with one or more of his coco-
nuts. I pass by the obvious question - what is in it for the captain
to make an offer that costs him two coconuts if accepted? - and
turn to the central point. If A and B know in advance their separate
roles, then it would be difficult to decide whether the losses to A
were sufficiently weighty to offset the gains to B. However, that is
not the situation at issue. The more precise parallel is a situation
where A and B both know that this offer may be forthcoming, but
have to decide their joint response to the offer before they know who
will profit or lose from it: would A and B each agree to accept the
captain's offer should he be the one to lose the coconut?
At this point, the inquiry turns on the level of risk aversion of the
parties. If it is slight, they may be willing to bind the future loser to
accept the offer (and each other not to collude with the captain in
order to increase the likelihood that the losses will be imposed on the
other party). It is a tricky question of whether the consequences of
this hypothetical agreement should be imposed upon the loser if it is
dreamed up after the fact. However, if the matter was put to them
before the offer came, what is the difficulty we face if they decide
that the risk is worth the gain? Surely if the offer were for 4000 or
even 4 coconuts, we could see an easy acceptance ex ante. Why then
dispute the decisionmaking strategy that works well in the easy cases
just because we have to face the harder ones?
The institutional issues involved with the unconstitutional condi-
3. See Abrams, supra note 1, at 365.
tions cases often involve situations in which new monopolies are cre-
ated by statute. There the analysis seems quite easy. Matters become
more difficult when the monopoly has already been established and
someone seeks to undercut it. In these cases where there has been a
prior mistake, it is never possible to correct it without imposing cer-
tain net losses that are in some sense undeserved. However, where
the allocative gains are large enough, it is probably worth changing
the legal rules even though there will be some uncompensated losers.
It is just impossible to correct for past institutional errors without
breaking some private china. It is too much for Professor Abrams to
ask for that level of purity in this context, when neither he nor any-
one else could demand it in any other.
The difference between our two positions is well captured by look-
ing at the situation that arose when foreign corporations claimed the
right to do business within a state without having to surrender their
right to remove cases to federal courts.4 Professor Abrams first notes
that here one sees the manifestation of monopoly power and then
indicates that there is no way to show that the elimination of the
restraint on removal makes everyone better off. Some local interests
will have to win, for otherwise a statute allowing removal would not
pass in the local legislature.
However, Professor Abrams' analysis is both misleading and in-
complete. First, it is not clear that the statute will produce net bene-
fits to in-state persons solely because it has commanded the in-state
legislative majority. The complications of public choice are ever at
work, and it is quite possible that the corporate winners from the
restrictive legislation are sufficiently cohesive that they can organize
a winning coalition even though consumers as a group suffer losses
greater than the gains that producers obtain.
The case for striking down the condition becomes even more pow-
erful when it is asked what happens if other states decide to follow
the lead of the first state and impose similar restrictions on out of
state corporations. Professor Abrams at one point insists that I have
"fail[ed] to suggest a single context in which the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions -has or could alleviate a problem of collective
action." , This case makes good that omission, as he himself appears
to acknowledge.
6
There are net social losses when one state imposes the restriction.
Other states now have an incentive to follow suit, in which case the
winners and losers will be reversed, but the losses will outweigh the
gains. Done over fifty states there is a perfect prisoner's dilemma
4. See id. at 368-69.
5. Id. at 361.
6. See id. at 382.
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game. It pays each state to impose the restrictions on access to fed-
eral court against outsiders whether or not other states follow suit.
Following the dominant strategy leads to a position that all states
would choose to avert if they could have acted collectively. Imposing
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine kills off that option. Faced
with the choice of letting in the corporations or keeping them out,
the corporations will be let in, as happened historically. The loss of
trade that follows from their exclusion is so great that it hurts the
insiders as well, and they will not engage in any self-destructive
activities.
In the end, therefore, the systematic removal of all limitations on
access to federal courts is likely to approach a Pareto superior posi-
tion, given the distribution of the gains across all fifty states. What is
true for the access to federal courts applies to the full range of dis-
criminatory taxes that are routinely prohibited under other applica-
tions of the doctrine. Why Professor Abrams should doubt the insti-
tutional importance of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is
quite beyond me. His learned exposition of the standard monopoly
conditions should have propelled him to the opposite conclusion. In-
deed when first introduced by Gordon Tullock, it was for exactly
that purpose.'
II. MOTIVATIONAL ANALYSIS
Professor Abrams also chides me for my willingness to use motiva-
tional analysis in order to handle difficult cases. In his view, because
strict economic analysis can only deal with overt behaviors, the use
of motive represents a regrettable lapse to traditional modes of anal-
ysis. However, a more sensible view of the situation allows us to see
the evidentiary role that motivational analysis plays in any compre-
hensive evaluation of constitutional questions. As fully elaborated,
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is an effort to detect at-
tempted redistributions that should not be tolerated under the consti-
tutional order.
In the case of taxation mentioned above, the protection against
redistribution extended to all forms of economic activity, which is
why taxes and other legal restrictions had to be kept uniform on
both insiders and outsiders. In the post-1937 period, however, eco-
nomic activities no longer receive, at least outside the interstate con-
7. See Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopoly, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J.
224 (1967).
text, the same level of protection against government regulation.
However, during this same period the rise of the second generation
of "preferred freedoms" has only transferred the redistribution ques-
tion from economic activities to, for example, freedom of speech or
the troubled boundary between church and state. Now the concerns
are not with overall economic efficiency, but with more limited social
concerns such as redistribution between religious and nonreligious
persons, or between Democrats and Republicans or vice versa.
One question that arises is how to identify cases in which these
forms of illicit redistribution have taken place. Here the most obvi-
ous evidence of such a redistribution is the motivation of the groups
that passed the legislation as gleaned from the statute itself or its
legislative history. When there is evidence that the statute was
meant to favor one group and to hurt another, evidence of motive is
fairly probative on the ultimate question of economic effect simply
because most interest groups know enough to choose the right means
to achieve their stated ends. In principle it should be possible to show
that a condition calls for an impermissible waiver of a constitutional
right even in the absence of bad motive. Conversely, although with
more difficulty, it may be possible to sustain a condition attached to
a grant even where it has been made with bad motive. However, it is
simply foolish to argue that the evidence is irrelevant just because it
is not conclusive.
In the early highway cases, it seems clear that the regulations
designed to frustrate competition between common carriers and
other road haulers were struck down on precisely motivational
grounds.8 Professor Abrams does little to advance sound adjudication
or legal analysis by saying that regulation of common carriers is not
worth undertaking because the state may have to regulate all truck-
ing simply because "it might be administratively unworkable to de-
fine 'common carrier' more precisely than as including all commer-
cial haulers. Or it might be the case that commercial haulers are less
likely to obey general traffic rules because the size of their vehicles
makes them less susceptible to injury."9 However, these idle "might
have beens" are not good enough. There are many states that limit
regulation to common carriers without facing undue definitional dif-
ficulties. A company that carries the goods of its private customers
to market in its own trucks, as did Frost Trucking,'" clearly falls
outside of any conceivable definition. The lawyers in that case
showed more wisdom than Professor Abrams on this point because
they did not quibble over verbal niceties.
8. See Frost & Frost Trucking v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
9. Abrams, supra note 1, at 370.
10. Frost, 271 U.S. at 583-84.
[VOL. 27: 395. 1990] Unconstitutional Conditions Obscured
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Likewise, his second point is far wide of the mark. There is no
evidence in the record that common carriers (even if correctly de-
fined) are larger than other trucks; nor, if they are, is there any rea-
son why a set of neutral traffic rules cannot subject them to heavier
fines, and to tort liability with greater damage awards, should they
be required. A rule that places the burden of proof on the state to
prove its proper motivation is easily workable in this context, and
could not be met in the Frost situation. There will be more difficult
problems in other cases, such as those involving the denial of charita-
ble deductions to organizations that engage in lobbying, which I
think should be denied, at least if the rule is applied even handedly
to all sides." What I cannot understand is why, when information
about the behavior of public bodies is hard to ascertain, Professor
Abrams thinks that economic analysis should regard motivational
questions as beside the point.
In dealing with motivational analysis, Professor Abrams particu-
larly criticizes my analysis of Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion. 2 As a matter of first principle, Nollan is one of the most diffi-
cult taking cases to understand even if it is agreed that the police
power of the state is so broad that it can prevent a private owner
from building on land without compensation to preserve, for exam-
ple, the public view of the beach. Even after that premise is in place,
the tactics of the Coastal Commission are most troublesome because
its threat to deny the permit makes it impossible for us to have a
direct comparison of the value of the easement to the public at large
and the value to its owner. The basic point is that the nature of the
choice in question forced the owner to compare the value of the ease-
ment with the value of the foregone improvement, where the former
is manifestly worth less to the owner than the latter. The doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions places a constraint on the governmental
bargaining game that forces the right comparison.
Professor Abrams' contribution to this debate is little more than
semantic. He first goes into a long detour about valuation in econom-
ics to conclude that exchanges do not necessarily allocate resources
to their highest value uses where the parties are constrained to make
direct exchanges (barter) of entitlements with each other.'3 True
enough, but irrelevant as well, for as Abrams notices, the moment
"we introduce money into this economy, we can free it from its pair-
11. See, Epstein, Foreword, supra note 2, at 78-79.
12. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
13. See Abrams, supra note 1, at 375-76.
ing difficulty." 14 However, all condemnation proceedings can involve
the use of money, so the constraints of barter disappear, and
Abrams' initial sally is an idle intellectual disgression that fails to
shed any light on the eminent domain problem at all. Indeed there is
a nice irony here. Abrams has begun with an explanation of the inef-
ficiency of a barter economy. One reason why the state should not be
allowed to force the landowner to choose between the easement and
the redevelopment is that the state's strategy introduces into the em-
inent domain process the element of barter inefficiency that Abrams
identified elsewhere, namely, where the state gets to keep one of the
entitlements, even though the private owner may attach a higher pri-
vate evaluation to both.
Abrams only compounds the confusion with his further observa-
tion that "Professor Epstein mistakenly believes that a voluntary sale
moves property to a higher value user." 15 Abrams' point here is a
minor verbal quibble with no substantive significance. His basic
norm is that economics does not allow us to make interpersonal com-
parisons of utility in a reasoned and demonstrable fashion. Any ref-
erence to value, high or low, is in his view an effort to render objec-
tive the idea. of value which, in his view, must remain fully
subjective. I share Professor Abrams' uneasiness with objective val-
ues. 16 Nonetheless, how the objective versus subjective value debate
is resolved is of no consequence for the immediate purpose. So long
as there is a voluntary sale, we know that there is a price above the
value the seller attaches to the goods, but below that which the
buyer attaches to the goods. The voluntary transaction allows us to
rank the preferences between these two parties, and the terms
"higher" and "lower" value are used to capture that relative rank-
ing. Professor Abrams concedes as much because the point he trum-
pets in the text is quietly withdrawn in the accompanying footnote:
"Of course, a voluntary exchange does produce a Pareto superior
state (absent externalities), so that voluntary exchanges should be
encouraged as beneficial to society,' 1 7 This was my whole point. The
use of the terms "higher" and "lower" value were not meant to un-
dermine the dominant role of subjective value, but to reinforce it.
The difficulties with subjective value are, of course, far more than
terminological when we move to the eminent domain context in
which the state forces the taking of property against the will of its
owner. With Nollan, however, it is possible, as I noted in the Fore-
14. Id. at 376.
15. Id. at 376-77.
16. See Epstein, Postscript: Subjective Utilitarianism, 12 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 769 (1989).
17. Abrams, supra note 1, at 377 n.78.
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word,' to develop the analysis without giving any special weight to
subjective value. If the value of the easement to the state is less than
its market value to the Nollans, then a fortiori its value to the state
is less than its subjective value to the Nollans. The complication with
subjective value does not weaken my analysis of Nollan; rather it
strengthens it by increasing the likelihood that the property has
moved from a higher to a lower value use.
In the end, it is highly ironic that Professor Abrams is supportive
of the state's bargaining strategy in Nollan. He is well aware of the
problem of aggregating individual preferences. He knows that the
eminent domain law does not respect subjective values. He knows of
the pitfalls pointed out by the public choice literature. Finally, he
knows that under Nollan the state is not precluded from taking the
viewing easement if it truly desires to do so because the state can
still pay for the viewing easement if it so chooses. Herein lies the
rub. I suspect that the state has not adopted this course of action
subsequent to its defeat, and that it was indeed bluffing when it
made the Nollans the ill-fated offer solely to extract the concession
that the Nollans refused to make. Either way it hardly matters. If
the easement was never condemned, then we know that the state did
not value it highly enough to make the transaction worthwhile; if the
easement was condemned, we now have valuable confirmation that
the transaction was worth undertaking.
III. EXTERNALTIES
I will comment only briefly on Professor Abrams' examination of
the externality question. Initially I raised the point in my paper to
indicate that consent to an agreement by A and B should not be
sufficient to allow them to kill or maim C, or indeed to bind C to any
contractual obligation that C has not assumed. The external losses to
C are likely to dwarf the gains to A and B, and we are better off
imposing some limits on the contract. The difficulties here arise in
distinguishing between those externalities, such as physical harm and
monopoly, that should be constrained and ordinary competitive
harms that should not be constrained. Both are in some sense exter-
nalities, and the differences between them cannot be suppressed en-
tirely. Nonetheless, one simple ground of distinction does commend
itself. Competitive externalities are those which would never be re-
dressed by bargaining for the reasons set out in the beginning of this
18. Epstein, Foreword, supra note 2, at 62 & n.167.
Reply.'9 The disappointed competitor could never pay the successful
competitor and its consumers enough money to make them want to
return to the status quo ante. In a monopoly situation, the all-potent
monopolist could be bought out by competitors and consumers, leav-
ing everyone better off than before.
Abrams' discussion of externalities does not, however, center on
these grand issues, but on my treatment20 of the externalities prob-
lem as it arose in Snepp v. United States.2 In Snepp, a former CIA
agent challenged the right of the CIA to impose a prepublication
review of his book under the contract that Snepp had signed while
an agent under the CIA.22 My position was, and is, that there was
little in this contract that one would not expect to see in certain
types of private employment arrangements. Further, the pressing
need for confidentiality in intelligence work makes this condition an
easy one to uphold against any charge that Snepp was coerced or
pressured into waiving his first amendment rights of freedom of
speech.
The clause of the agreement that was breached did not concern
the content of the book as such, for the CIA agreed in principle that
unclassified information could be published under the contract.
What concerned the CIA was the possibility that published informa-
tion would compromise classified information or sources. The pre-
publication review was necessary to address that issue. Yet it was
forestalled by the decision to publish without submitting the book to
that practice. If Snepp could get away without review, then so could
everyone else. The constructive trust remedy on Snepp's proceeds of
sale is an effective way to induce others to follow procedures when
publication takes place before an injunction can be granted. When
the CIA overreaches, the contract could allow Snepp to challenge
the CIA's determination.
So conceived there seems to be no externality question raised in
the case. However, Professor Abrams introduces one when he notes
that the enforcement of the CIA agreement will impose an external-
ity in the "loss to the public's right to read the story." 2' 3 Again his
point is far too cute. By his account every trade secret agreement or
confidentiality arrangement would be subject to an externality at-
tack, although there is good reason to believe that the production
and sharing of information induced by its protection generates an
enormous net social benefit. The same point applies here. There is no
reason to assume that the public invariably benefits from the publi-
19. See supra at pages 396-97.
20. See Epstein, Foreword, supra note 2, at 68-70.
21. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
22. Id. at 507-08.
23. Abrams, supra note 1, at 383.
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cation of this CIA information. If the information is classified, publi-
cation places it in the hands not only of the public but also of our
national enemies. Even with nonclassified information, many mem-
bers of the public would prefer that certain things be done in private
than disclosed to the entire world. They are willing to pay the price
of being kept ignorant if they can ensure that others will be kept
ignorant as well. Therefore, there are externalities of publication just
as there are externalities of nonpublication.
Given the endless externalities that can arise, the range of possible
solutions is very broad, and trying to aggregate these preferences is
tricky business. However, in the range of solutions that are appropri-
ate, there is something to be said for developing a uniform Congres-
sional policy on the dissemination by individual employees. At least
here the pros and cons of the disclosure will be considered in a more
balanced fashion than they were by Snepp, whose sole interest was
to line his own pockets. The first amendment works best when it
protects those individuals who seek to publish information which
they acquired from their own independent sources from censorship
and review by the government. It works far more fitfully when the
government seeks to restrain the activities of its own, employees who
have been entrusted with sensitive information. Given the balancing
act implicit in the legislative scheme (which permitted prepublica-
tion review but not the censorship of unclassified information), there
is little reason to believe that this statute is bad on its face, and none
to believe that the CIA acted improperly given that Snepp bypassed
its procedures and published his book secretly. Professor Abrams'
facile and incomplete account of Snepp affords powerful, if indirect
evidence, that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is better di-
rected toward government monopoly power than the soft externali-
ties that abound everywhere in public life.
IV. CONCLUSION
In his parting words of wisdom, Professor Abrams seeks to wrap
himself in the mantle of the great Judge Cardozo whose book The
Nature of the Judicial Process contains words of praise for the un-
certainty that is inevitable and necessary in the judicial process.
However, in some sense the praise for Cardozo is misplaced because
we should never seek to celebrate uncertainty in the law, even if on
occasion we must be reconciled to it. In my Foreword I sought to
show how the tools of modern bargaining theory, especially as they
related to the formation of prisoner dilemmas and the use of monop-
405
oly power, could organize much of the inchoate intuitions about the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. As ever, even after the basic
scaffolding is in place, there will be hard cases, like Nollan, that test
the limits of the doctrine and may in the end leave it exposed to fatal
objection. However, intellectual progress is never made by ostenta-
tious recountings of the known literature or heartfelt lamentations on
the difficulty of doing systematic work. It is made by pushing beyond
the known contours of knowledge and hoping that the basic thesis
will survive the counterattacks that come its way. Professor Abrams'
work is largely critical, wholly negative, and fundamentally mis-
guided. It does nothing in and of itself to illuminate the decided
cases, to resolve discordant lines of authority,2 4 or to advance a uni-
fied theory of the subject matter that could be tested or evaluated by
others. He adds nothing to the sum of human knowledge - even if
he quotes Cardozo.
24. For example, in the introduction he notes that the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine did not protect Bob Jones University. Bob Jones University v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983). Yet he never stops to ask whether the decision is correct or incor-
rect. See Abrams, supra note 1, at 359. My criticism of Bob Jones is found in Epstein,
Foreword, supra note 2, at 94-96.
